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Background
With the current popularity of online social networks, more and more information is 
distributed through social network services [2]. Participants in online social networks 
want to share information and experiences with as many reliable users as possible [3–5]. 
Trust is a basis of social network services. However, the modeling of trust is complicated 
and application-dependent [6–8]. Modeling trust needs to consider interaction history, 
recommendation, user behaviors and so on. Therefore, modeling trust is an important 
focus for online social networks [9–11].
In online social websites, such as Amazon, eBay, and FilmTrust, the existing trust models 
are mainly constructed based on nodes’ global trust. However, these models fail to filter 
false feedback and distrustful recommendation, which leads to inaccuracy of the measure-
ment results. Because it is common that nodes intend to be selfish, the free-riding phenom-
enon often occurs in social networks, resulting in the decrease of network performance 
[12]. For free-riding, the so-called free-riders attempt to benefit from network resources of 
others without offering their own resources in exchange [13]. The goal of our work is to 
build an effective trust measurement model that can benefit social network services, such 
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as controlling feedback, recommendation, and strategy selection. In an effort to resolve the 
above problems, the main contributions of our work are summarized as follows.
1. To more accurately measure trust degree of a node, we introduce three novel evalua-
tion factors which are service reliability, feedback effectiveness and recommendation 
credibility.
2. Another practical problem considered in this paper is the free-riding problem. We 
propose punishment mechanisms for specific trust and global trust, respectively, 
which is different from the existing works where statistic methods are commonly 
used. In our punishment mechanism, we employ the evolutionary game theory 
which is more flexible and effective.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: "Related works" section reviews the related 
works and presents the motivation for our work. "The proposed trust measurement 
model" section introduces the proposed trust measurement model for social networks. 
"Simulations and performance analysis" section illustrates our simulation results and 
analysis of the results. Conclusions and future work are shown in "The proposed trust 
measurement model" section.
Related works
Much effort has been spent on trust measurement models to depict trust behaviors in 
complex networks. Trust measurement methods under open network environment and 
trust measurement methods based on Agent synergy are the most important trust meas-
urement methods.
Trust measurement methods under open network environment
Beth et  al. [14] first proposed a trust measurement method under open network envi-
ronment. In their work, trust is regarded as direct trust and recommendation trust, and 
a probabilistic method is adopted to represent trust. The PeerTrust model [15] uses the 
transaction and the community background as the source of reputation feedback. It can 
act as a defense against some of the subtle malicious attacks, e.g., a seller develops a good 
reputation by being honest for small transactions and tries to make a big profit by being 
dishonest for large transactions. The EigenRep model [16] assumes that if the direct trust 
between a node and the destination node is higher, the recommendation trust is more reli-
able. The model uses direct trust to calculate the global trust. This model can effectively 
solve the bad effect caused by the malicious recommendation. Wang et al. [17] proposed a 
trust model based on Bayesian network. This model investigates how to describe different 
aspects of trust to obtain various properties of entities according to different scenes. Wang 
et  al. [18] solved the problem of recommendation trust based on the Bayesian method. 
This method calculates recommendation trust based on experts’ experience. Lu et al. [19] 
proposed an evaluation method of software reliability. It is a bottom-up calculation process 
of trust level that can decompose and synthetically derive a parallel structure, so that the 
trust value of a system can be calculated accurately. However, there are still some shortages 
about this kind of models. They only adopt probabilistic model to establish subjective trust 
model. In other words, subjectivity and uncertainty of trust are equivalent to randomness. 
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They also adopt the averaging method to calculate recommendation trust, which cannot 
reflect the real situations of a trust relationship.
Trust measurement methods based on Agent synergy
In Agent synergy, trust means that a collaborative agent can properly and nondestruc-
tively predict subjective possibility of a collaborative activity. The source of prediction is 
the goal service behavior that previous agent observes. Prediction results are affected by 
evaluation of important degree from the agent, such as key collaborative activities and sec-
ondary collaborative activities [20, 21]. The eBay trust model is one of the most successful 
cases. In this model, the entities evaluate each other after each transaction. The structure 
of this system is straightforward, and the computation cost is small. Because trust between 
agents is associated with other entities’ subjective understanding and fuzziness, it cannot 
be described and managed by conventional and accurate logic. Subjective trust as a cogni-
tive phenomenon, whose subjectivity and uncertainty present fuzziness, is often managed 
by Fuzzy Set-based methods. It not only reflects fuzziness of agent trust, but also describes 
the trust mechanism between agents with intuitive and concise semantics. Tang et al. [22] 
first proposed the definition and evaluation of trust based on the fuzzy set theory. They 
gave formalization and deducted rules of trust to construct a complete subjective trust 
management model. However, this kind of model fails to consider the cooperative cheating 
behaviors, which cannot detect the community of cooperative cheating.
In addition, some recent works are also remarkable. Shi et al. [23] proposed a dynamic 
P2P trust model based on the time-window feedback mechanism. The model considers 
the inherent connection among trust, reputation and incentive and the effect of time 
factor on the trust computation. Gan et  al. [24] proposed a reputation-based multi-
dimensional trust (RMDT) algorithm which makes use of a self-confident coefficient to 
synthesize the direct and recommendation trust to evaluate the nodes in a network. A 
multi-dimensional trust mechanism is also introduced to improve sensitivity of RMDT 
on a single attribute. Meng et al. [25] proposed the @Trust model. Bedi et al. [26] pro-
posed a trust-based recommender system using ant colony for trust computation. Zhang 
et al. [27] proposed a trust evaluation method based on the cloud model.
These models have promoted the development of trust measurement models. How-
ever, most of the existing models failed to filter false feedback and distrustful recom-
mendation, which leads to inaccuracy of measurement results. In addition, free-riding 
problem was not comprehensively considered in most of the existing trust measurement 
models. Considering these problems, this paper proposes a game theory-based trust 
measurement model for social networks. The proposed model introduces three novel 
evaluation factors which are service reliability, feedback effectiveness and recommenda-
tion credibility to more accurately measure the trust degree of a node.
The proposed trust measurement model
To describe the trust degree more accurately, this paper divides nodes into four cate-
gories, which are service nodes, feedback nodes, recommendation nodes and managed 
nodes. In social networks, trust represents the level of confidence about the reliability 
and correctness of entity’s behaviors. Service reliability indicates the trustworthiness of 
service that service nodes provide; feedback effectiveness represents the trustworthiness 
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of feedback that feedback nodes return; recommendation credibility expresses the trust-
worthiness of recommendation that recommendation nodes give. In this paper, the 
global trust of the node i, denoted as Ti, is the probability of i being correct. The service 
reliability is denoted as ST ; the feedback effectiveness is denoted as FT ; and the recom-
mendation credibility is denoted as CT .
In this paper, let i be a service node, j be a feedback node and k be a recommendation 
node; and Mi, Mj, Mk are the managed nodes of i, j, k, respectively.
When feedback node j requests a specific service s, the managed node Mj searches for 
the trust node which can provide service s. If there exists such a node, say node i, node j 
requests the service from node i. If not, Mj searches for the recommendation node k. Then, 
node k recommends a service node i with the maximum trust degree that can provide ser-
vice s to node j. If there does not exist a recommendation node k, the transaction fails.
The trust measurement process
In this model, the specific feedback value fvj,i, given by the feedback node j, is known by 
the system. Therefore, we obtain the calculation method of service reliability based on 
the specific feedback value fvj,i, which is shown by Eq. (1).
In Eq. (1), set(i) is the set of feedback nodes that communicated with service node i, and 
θ is the threshold of feedback effectiveness. (j, i) presents the influence effect of node j 
on node i. In addition, FT j represents the feedback effectiveness of node j.
In social networks, some feedback nodes may evaluate some trust nodes maliciously 
and praise some distrustful nodes. Therefore, we should also evaluate the trust degree of 
fvj,i. In this paper, we calculate the feedback effectiveness based on similarity of specific 
feedback values. The feedback effectiveness of node j can be derived through a similarity 
formula as shown by Eq. (2).
In Eq. (2), set(j, r) presents the node-pair set that both nodes communicated with node i. 
Similar with the calculation method of service reliability, the recommendation credibil-
ity of node k is computed by Eq. (3).
In Eq.  (3), Rset(k) is the node set recommended by recommendation node k before. 
(k , i) presents the influence effect of node k on node i. There are two factors affecting 
the value of (k , i). One is the time interval T = tn − tp, tn presents the current time, and 
tp presents the time that node k recommends node i. Another is the connection degree 
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In this paper, how to determine the connection degree ωk ,i is considered. According 
to the successful transaction Trsuc and the number of total transactions |Tr| between 
node k and node i, we determine the connection degree ωk ,i, which is shown as Eq. (5). 
In Eq.  (5), successful transaction Trsuc is an indicative function, if CT> Threshold, 
Trsuc = 1, otherwise, Trsuc = 0.
According to the above analysis, the global trust degree is shown in Eq. (6). In Eq. (6), α , 
β and γ are weights for service reliability, feedback effectiveness and recommendation 
credibility, and α + β + γ = 1.
If a service node provides distrust service, i.e. the service reliability is less than the ser-
vice threshold ρ, the node will enter the service punishment cycle. In the service punish-
ment cycle, a node should not provide any service. If a feedback node provides distrust 
feedback, i.e. the feedback effectiveness is less than the feedback threshold θ, the node 
will enter the feedback punishment cycle. In the feedback punishment cycle, a node 
should not request any service. If a recommendation node provides distrust recommen-
dation, i.e. the recommendation credibility is less than the recommendation threshold 
δ, the node will enter the recommendation punishment cycle. In the recommendation 
punishment cycle, a node should not provide any recommendation.
The process of direct interaction is summarized in Algorithm 1. In this direct inter-
action algorithm, the service reliability ST  and the feedback effectiveness FT j will be 
output.
Algorithm 1 The process of direct interaction.
Input:
The feedback value from node j, fvj,i;
The set of feedback nodes that communicated with service node i, set(i);
The node-pair set that both nodes communicated with node i, set(j, r);
The time interval, T ;
The connection degree of the relationship between node j and node i, ωj,i;
Output:
Service reliability, STi;
Feedback effectiveness, FTj ;
1: A feedback node j requests service s. The managed node Mj of node j searches for a trusted node
i that can provide service s. If there exists such a node i, go to 2. Otherwise, go to 7.
2: Mj requests service from the managed node Mi of node i. Mj checks that whether node j is in
the feedback punishment cycle. If so, go to 7. Otherwise, go to 3.
3: Node i provides service for node j. Node j computes the service reliability of service s.
4: Mj computes whether the feedback from node j can be trusted. If the feedback effectiveness is
larger than θ, go to 5. Otherwise, go to 8.
5: Mj sends the trust degree of service s to Mi. Mj updates the feedback effectiveness of node j. If
the service reliability is larger than ρ, go to 6. Otherwise, go to 7.
6: Mi updates the service reliability of node i. Node i enters the service punishment cycle. Then go
to 9.
7: Mi updates the service reliability of node i. Then go to 9.
8: Mj updates the feedback effectiveness of node j. Node j enters the feedback punishment cycle.
9: return STi and FTj .
If there is not a trusted service node i that has interacted with the feedback node j 
directly, it needs a recommendation node k to recommend a trusted node j for service 





(6)Ti = α · STi + β · FTi + γ · CTi
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Algorithm 2 The process of indirect interaction.
Input:
The feedback value from node j, fvj,i;
The set of feedback nodes that communicated with service node i, set(i);
The node-pair set that both nodes communicated with node i, set(j, r);
The node set recommended by recommendation node k before, Rset(k);
The time interval, T ;
The connection degree of the relationship between node j and node i, ωj,i;
Output:
Service reliability, STi;
Feedback effectiveness, FTj ;
Recommendation credibility, CTk ;
1: A feedback node j requests service s. The managed node Mj searches for the recommendation
node k which can recommend node i that can provide service s. If there exists a recommendation
node k, go to 2. Otherwise, go to 7.
2: Node k requests from the managed node Mi of node i. Mi checks that whether node j is in the
feedback punishment cycle. If so, go to 7. Otherwise, go to 3.
3: Node i provides service s for node j. Node j computes the service reliability of service s.
4: Node j computes the recommendation credibility of the recommendation node k. Mk updates the
recommendation credibility of node k. If the recommendation credibility of node k is less than δ,
k enters the recommendation punishment cycle. In addition, Mj computes whether the feedback
from node j can be trusted. If the feedback effectiveness is larger than θ, go to 5. Otherwise, go
to 8.
5: Mj sends the service reliability of service s to Mi. Mj updates the feedback effectiveness of node
j. If the service reliability of node i is larger than ρ, go to 6. Otherwise, go to 7.
6: Mi updates the service reliability of node i. Then go to 9.
7: Mi updates the service reliability of node i. Node i enters the service punishment cycle. Then go
to 9.
8: Mj updates the feedback effectiveness of node j. Node j enters the feedback punishment cycle.
9: return STi, FTj and CTk.
The punishment mechanisms
To resolve free-riding problem in social networks, two punishment mechanisms are pro-
posed for specific trust and global trust degree, respectively. According to specific trust 
(service reliability, feedback effectiveness and recommendation credibility), this paper 
designs three punishment cycles, so that to restrain the specific trust behaviors of nodes. 
According to global trust, this paper gives a game theory-based punishment mechanism 
[28] to resolve the free-riding problem for social networks.
For specific trust, we design a specific punishment mechanism and divide punishment 
cycles into service punishment cycle, feedback punishment cycle and recommendation 
punishment cycle. Once a node has selfish behaviors, the node will enter punishment 
cycle. In the period of punishment cycle, the node must be cooperative and honest to 
restore its reputation. In addition, other nodes reject to provide services to this node. 
After the punishment cycle, the node can replay transactions. According to different 
selfish behaviors, this paper gives different punishment strategies, which are shown as 
followings.
1. Service punishment cycle. If the service reliability STi < ρ, node i will enter service 
punishment cycle. In the service punishment cycle, a node cannot provide service for 
other nodes and cannot request any service.
2. Feedback punishment cycle. If the feedback effectiveness FTi < θ, node i will enter 
feedback punishment cycle. In the feedback punishment cycle, a node cannot request 
any service. However, it can provide service for other nodes.
3. Recommendation punishment cycle. If the recommendation credibility CTi < δ, 
node i will enter recommendation punishment cycle. In the recommendation pun-
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ishment cycle, a node cannot recommend any node. However, it can request and 
provide service for other nodes.
According to global trust, this paper proposes a punishment mechanism based on multi-
strategy game to inspire nodes to select the strategies with high trust degree. T  indi-
cates the whole trust degree of node i. We divide trust degrees into five levels as shown 
in Table 1.
The five-strategy matrix is shown in Table  2. In Table  2, prijA is the profit value that 
node A obtains, if A game with B that A adopts strategy i, and entity B adopts strategy 
j. And prijB is the profit value that B obtains, if B game with A that B adopts strategy i, 
and A adopts strategy j. Through game analyzing nodes’ behaviors in social networks, 
we can know that the multi-strategy game matrix is a symmetric matrix. In the analy-
sis for dynamics model, this game is performed repeatedly. At the end of each stage of 
multi-strategy game, any participant’s strategy as a historical information can be known 
by other participants. In addition, all participants select and update their strategies for 
next stage of game based on historical information.
To prevent selfish nodes from selecting the strategy with low trust degree to be their 
preferred strategy for getting more benefits, i.e. to restrain the free-riding phenomenon, 
a punishment mechanism is established to inspire nodes to select the strategies with 
high trust degree based on the multi-strategy game. In the case of i < j, the calculation 
method of benefits after adding punishment mechanism is shown by Eq. (7). When i = j, 
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When two nodes game with each other, for the node with higher trust degree, system 
will increase its rewards; for the node with lower trust degree, system will decrease its 
earnings. µ is a punishment parameter. Because the game matrix is a symmetric matrix, 
the punishment parameter is symmetric too. In this paper, if the value of (Trust i − Trust 
j) is bigger, µ will increase.
Complexity analysis
In this trust measurement model, we need to compute service reliability, feedback 
effectiveness and recommendation credibility for one node. According to a node’s ser-
vice reliability, the computational complexity is O(l), where l represents that this node 
has provided services for l nodes ever before. According to a node’s feedback effec-
tiveness, the computational complexity is O(m), where m indicates that m nodes pro-
vided feedbacks for this node. According to a node’s recommendation credibility, the 
computational complexity is O(n), where n represents that n nodes were recommended 
by this node before. Therefore, the computational complexity of a node’s global trust is 
O(l +m+ n). The proposed trust measurement model can be computed in polynomial 
time, thus it is computationally efficient.
Simulations and performance analysis
In this section, we present the simulation results to verify the effectiveness of the pro-
posed model. The hardware simulation environment is: Intel Core (TM) Duo 2.66 GHz 
CPU, 2GB Memory, Windows XP operating system, and Matlab 7.0 simulation plat-
form. We simulate real online social networks in our experiments. In simulations, 1000 
nodes are simulated. There are two kinds of nodes, normal nodes and malicious nodes. 
There are two types of normal nodes which are completely trustful nodes that can pro-
vide trustful service, feedback and recommendation, and mix-type trustful nodes that 
provide trustful feedback and recommendation, but random service quality. 20  % of 
files have low quality, i.e. malicious files. Malicious nodes include three types which are 
completely malicious nodes that provide questionable service, feedback and recommen-
dation, random malicious nodes that provide questionable service, feedback and recom-
mendation with a certain probability (in the simulations, the probability is 50 %), and 
disguised malicious nodes that provide trustful service and recommendation but ques-
tionable feedback. In the simulations, there are 1000 nodes, including 30 % completely 
trustful nodes, 30  % mix-type trustful nodes, 10  % completely malicious nodes, 20  % 
random malicious nodes, and 10 % disguised malicious nodes. The simulation setting is 
shown in Table 3 where 1 represents completely trustful, 0 represents completely ques-
tionable, and ε represents randomly trustful.
Table 3 The simulation setting
The style of nodes/trust Service Feedback Recommendation
Ct 1 1 1
Tt ε 1 1
Cm 0 0 0
Rm ε ε ε
Dm 1 0 1
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Experimental verification for specific trust
We measure the evolution of trust degree according to service reliability, feedback effec-
tiveness and recommendation credibility respectively. Figure 1 presents the initial evolu-
tion trend of service reliability without any punishment mechanism. From Fig. 1, it can be 
seen that there exists free-riding problem. The proportions of completely malicious nodes 
(Cm) and random malicious nodes (Rm) increase steadily in first 50 generations. After 
that, network tends to be stable. Therefore, if there is not any punishment mechanism, 
malicious nodes will dominate the evolutionary direction of the whole network. Figure 2 
shows the ideal condition by adopting punishment mechanism. From Fig. 2, it can be seen 
that completely trustful nodes (Ct) will dominant the evolutionary direction of the whole 
network with the proposed punishment mechanism. However, the proportion of any other 
type of nodes will decrease to 0. In this case, only completely trustful nodes (Ct) can sur-
vive in network. It will cause new nodes entering network to be dead, because they do 
not have any historical trust information. To resolve this problem, we adjust the strength 
of punishment to avoid cold boot problem, as shown in Fig. 3. From Fig. 3, it can be seen 
that the proportions of completely trustful nodes (Ct) and disguised malicious nodes (Dm) 
increase steadily, and tend to be stable in the end. It is because that disguised malicious 
nodes (Dm) can provide trustful service so that they can survive in network.
Figures 4, 5 and 6 show the evolution trend of feedback effectiveness. Figure 4 presents 
the initial evolution trend of feedback effectiveness without any punishment mechanism. 
From Fig. 4, it can be seen that the free-riding problem occurs. The proportions of com-
pletely malicious nodes (Cm), random malicious nodes (Rm) and disguised malicious nodes 
(Dm) increase steadily in first 50 generations. After that, network tends to be stable. Since 
disguised malicious nodes (Dm) provide distrustful feedback, they will obtain more benefits 
than the nodes that provide trustful feedback without any punishment mechanism. Figure 5 
shows the ideal case by adopting punishment mechanism. From Fig. 5, it can be seen that 
Fig. 1 The initial evolution trend of service reliability without punishment
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completely trustful nodes (Ct) will dominate the evolutionary direction of the whole net-
work with the proposed punishment mechanism. However, the proportion of any other 
type of nodes will decrease to 0. In this case, only completely trustful nodes (Ct) can survive 
in network. Figure 6 shows the evolutionary results after adjusting the strength of punish-
ment. It can be seen that the proportions of completely trustful nodes (Ct) and mix-type 
trustful nodes (Tt) increase steadily, and tend to be stable in the end. This is because that 
mix-type trustful nodes (Tt) can provide trustful feedback, and they will survive in network.
Fig. 2 The evolution trend of service reliability with punishment
Fig. 3 The evolution trend of service reliability with adjusted punishment
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Figures 7, 8 and 9 show the evolution trend of recommendation credibility. Figure 7 
presents the initial evolution trend of recommendation credibility without any punish-
ment mechanism. From Fig. 7, it can be seen that there is free-riding problem in net-
work. The proportions of completely malicious nodes (Cm) and random malicious 
nodes (Rm) increase steadily in first 50 generations. After that, network tends to be sta-
ble. Figure 8 shows the ideal case by adopting punishment mechanism. From Fig. 8, it 
Fig. 4 The initial evolution trend of feedback effectiveness without punishment
Fig. 5 The evolution trend of feedback effectiveness with punishment
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can be seen that completely trustful nodes (Ct) will dominate the evolutionary direction 
of the whole network with the proposed punishment mechanism. However, the propor-
tion of any other type of nodes will decrease to 0. In this case, only completely trust-
ful nodes (Ct) can survive in network. Therefore, Fig. 9 shows the evolutionary results 
after adjusting the strength of punishment. It can be seen that the proportions of com-
pletely trustful nodes (Ct) and mix-type trustful nodes (Tt) increase steadily, and tend to 
Fig. 6 The evolution trend of feedback effectiveness with adjusted punishment
Fig. 7 The initial evolution trend of recommendation credibility without punishment
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be stable in the end. The reason is that mix-type trustful nodes (Tt) can provide trustful 
recommendation, and they will survive in network.
Experimental verification for global trust
We also verify the effectiveness for global punishment mechanism. According to the 
simulations for specific trust, this section combines the measurement results of service 
Fig. 8 The evolution trend of recommendation credibility with punishment
Fig. 9 The evolution trend of recommendation credibility with adjusted punishment
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reliability, feedback effectiveness and recommendation credibility to measure the trust 
evolution of the whole network. Figure  10 shows the initial evolution results. From 
Fig. 10, we can see that if there is not any punishment mechanism, the free-riding phe-
nomenon will occur. The free-riding problem can be resolved by employing global pun-
ishment mechanism as shown in Fig.11.
Fig. 10 The initial evolution trend of trust without punishment
Fig. 11 The evolution trend of trust with punishment
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Conclusion
In social networks, trust relationships between nodes are the basis of service transac-
tions. However, the establishment of trust relationship is a complex progressive process 
depending on interaction history, trust recommendation, trust management and so on. 
Therefore, modeling trust relationship needs to take into account multiple decision fac-
tors. Considering the existing problems of trust models, this paper proposes a game 
theory-based trust measurement model for social networks where trust degree is deter-
mined by three aspects, which are service reliability, feedback effectiveness, and rec-
ommendation credibility. Based on game theory, we propose punishment mechanisms 
according to specific trust and global trust respectively to resolve free-riding problem. 
The simulation results show the effectiveness of the proposed trust measurement model. 
It also shows that the proposed punishment mechanisms can prevent free-riding phe-
nomenon effectively. As a future work, we will further investigate more specific trust 
relationships between nodes, e.g., family, best friends, and classmates. We plan to study 
how to find ordered trust node set in social networks.
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